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I. INTRODUCTION
Consider this hypothetical. Plaintiff, an avid amateur airplane pilot,
miraculously survives when his rental plane crashes in the Florida
Everglades. He sues Airtron, the company from which he rented the
plane, and Boex, the plane's manufacturer. Prior to trial, plaintiff
deposes Airtron's president, who states that her company had a difficult
time maintaining the Boex plane because certain bolts routinely
loosened from the stress of flight. In her opinion, this "design defect"
was the sole cause of plaintiff's crash. Subsequently, plaintiff settles
with Airtron. Although he had a strong case against the rental company
because the plane's service records were in disarray, the settlement
amount is small. (Perhaps this is because Airtron is relatively
underinsured). Later, at trial against Boex, the president of Airtron
testifies as plaintiffs star witness. Consistent with her deposition
testimony, she states that the Boex plane's "design defect" was the sole
cause of plaintiff's crash.
Counsel for Boex rises to cross-examine Airtron's president. Before
he can speak, plaintiffs counsel objects pursuant to Florida Statutes
Sections 90.408 and 768.041(3) and requests a hearing at sidebar. The
judge asks for an offer of proof. Boex's counsel tells the judge about the
earlier settlement between plaintiff and Airtron, characterizing it as a
very sweet deal. "Our position, Your Honor, is that one of the terms of
that settlement-unwritten to be sure-was that Airtron would point the
finger at Boex during this trial to help plaintiff recover a high dollar
verdict at Boex's expense. Furthermore, Airtron's president first gave
her testimony when Airtron was a defendant in this case, a time when
she had an obvious motivation to assign blame to an alternative
defendant. Here, at trial, Airtron's president has clear incentive to not
contradict her prior sworn testimony. All of this amounts to obvious
bias,' and points to an intense motivation on the part of Airtron's
1. In this Article, we use the term "bias" as a shorthand reference for any evidence that
tends to undermine the credibility of a witness based upon inferences of bias (for a party),
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president to give testimony that is unfavorable to Boex. The jury must
be made aware of this so that it can properly weigh the credibility of
this witness."
Plaintiff responds that evidence of a prior settlement is barred by
Florida Evidence Code Rule 90.408 and Florida Statutes Section
768.041(3). "These provisions are designed to protect parties who
compromise and settle a claim from having that used against them at
trial, Your Honor. We are simply asking for the protection afforded us
by law."
To most civil litigators considering this hypothetical, at least those
who practice outside the State of Florida, the common sense response of
the judge would be, "Objection overruled. I will allow this line of
inquiry on cross." Credibility of a witness is such a fundamental issue
that the admission of bias evidence is not only routine, it usually carries
the day despite claims that it negatively impacts other interests served
by the Rules.2 Furthermore, although disclosure of a prior settlement
may run contrary to the public policy encouraging settlements, the
public policy of fair trials and accurate verdicts typically outweighs
most other considerations.3 However, such common sense did not
prevail in the Florida Supreme Court's recent decision in Saleeby v.
Rocky Elson Construction, Inc., 3 So. 3d 1078 (Fla. 2009).
II. THE SALEEBY DECISION
Albert Saleeby was working on a construction site when roof trusses
collapsed on him.4 The accident rendered Saleeby a paraplegic.s
Saleeby sued the truss manufacturer, A-1 Roof Trusses, Ltd. (Al), and
Rocky Elson Construction Co. (Rocky Elson), Saleeby's employer and
prejudice (against a party), interest (in the outcome of the litigation), and corruption (due to, for
example, a bribe or a very high expert fee). See, e.g., CHARLES W. EHRHARDT, FLORIDA'S
EVIDENCE, § 608.5 (2009) (listing numerous types of matters that demonstrate bias, including
those "that relate to the interest of the witness, favoritism, and corruption").
2. See EHRHARDT, supra note 1, § 608.1:
All witnesses who testify during a trial place their credibility in issue.
Regardless of the subject matter of the witness's testimony, a party on cross-
examination may inquire into matters that affect the truthfulness of the
witness's testimony. .. . [T]he credibility of the witness is always a proper
subject of cross-examination.
3. See Richard Blakely Glasgow, Comment, A Settlement by Less than all Joint
Tortfeasors: How Much Should the Jury Know? A Bright-Line Rule Outside the Scope of
Arkansas Rule ofEvidence 408, 62 ARK. L. REV. 77, 98 (2009).
4. Saleeby v. Rocky Elson Constr., Inc., 3 So. 3d 1078, 1080 (Fla. 2009).
5. Id.
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the construction company that installed the trusses.6 During discovery,
Saleeby deposed John Herring, Al's president, who testified that the
trusses failed due to Rocky Elson's faulty installation.7 Saleeby
subsequently settled his case against Al and proceeded to trial against
Rocky Elson.8
At trial, Saleeby sought to show that Rocky Elson's failure to
properly install the roof trusses caused their collapse.9 Accordingly,
Saleeby called Herring to testify consistent with his deposition.' 0 Over
Saleeby's objection, Rocky Elson impeached Herring on cross-
examination with evidence that: (1) Al had previously been a defendant
in the case; (2) Al and Saleeby had settled prior to trial; (3) Al paid
Saleeby money to settle the suit; (4) Herring's deposition testimony,
blaming Rocky Elson for the truss failure, had taken place while Al was
itself a defendant; and (5) post-settlement, Herring agreed to testify
against Rocky Elson at trial." The trial court ruled this testimon
admissible as evidence of Herring's possible bias toward Saleeby.'
Essential to the court's ruling was its belief that Herring, as the
president of Al, had a "direct interest" in the case. Herring rendered his
original opinion about the trusses' faulty installation prior to Al settling
the case with Saleeby, a time when he had a strong interest in
exonerating his own company.1 3 The bias theoretically continued after
settlement because Herring would not want to contradict his own prior
sworn testimony at trial.' 4
The trial court found that Saleeby was not entitled to recover
damages.15 Saleeby appealed to Florida's Fourth District Court of
Appeal, and asserted that Florida Statutes Sections 768.041(3) and
90.408 prohibited the introduction of evidence about Al's settlement
with Saleeby to impeach Herring.' 6 The Fourth District Court of Appeal
disagreed and affirmed the lower court's holding.' 7
On review, the Florida Supreme Court reversed.' It held, in a 4-3
6. Id.
7. See id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See id.
11. Id. at 1081.
12. Initial Brief on the Merits of Petitioner Albert Saleeby at 9, Saleeby v. Rocky Elson
Constr., Inc., 3 So. 3d 1078 (Fla. 2009) (No. SCO7-2252) [hereinafter Initial Brief].
13. Id.; Answer Brief on Merits of Respondent at 10, Saleeby v. Rocky Elson Constr.,
Inc., 3 So. 3d 1078 (Fla. 2009) (No. SCO7-2252) [hereinafter Answer Brief|.
14. See Saleeby, 3 So. 3d at 1087 (Canady, J., dissenting).
15. Id. at 1081 (majority opinion).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1086.
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per curiam decision, that Florida Statutes sections 768.041(3) and
90.408 categorically prohibit the admission at trial of evidence of a
prior settlement or the dismissal of a defendant from the lawsuit, and
that a violation of these statutes constitutes reversible error. 19
III. BACKGROUND OF FLORIDA LAw REGARDING THE ADMISSIBILITY
OF SETTLEMENT EVIDENCE
A. Florida's Twin Prohibitions
Two Florida statutes address the issue of whether settlement
evidence regarding a previous defendant is admissible at trial.20 Florida
Evidence Code Section 90.408 excludes evidence of a settlement when
it is offered "to prove liability or absence of liability for the claim or its
value." 21 Florida Statute Section 768.041(3), on the other hand,prohibits disclosure to the jury of "a release or covenant not to sue" or
"that any defendant has been dismissed" from a suit.22 These two
statutes generally "promote Florida's public policy favoring settlement
by excluding such prejudicial evidence at trial." 23
1. Florida Evidence Code Section 90.408 (As Interpreted Pre-Saleeby)
Although the Florida Supreme Court majority in Saleeby did not
acknowledge the pertinent language, the settlement exclusion in Section
90.408 is not absolute. The plain language of the rule only forbids
evidence admitted "to prove liability or absence of liability" regarding
the claim being litigated.24 As a result, Florida appellate courts have
routinely held that if the evidence of settlement or compromise is
offered for another relevant purpose, it is not barred by Section 90.408
and is admissible under the principle of "limited admissibility."25 This
limitation is consistent with Florida Evidence Code Section 90.107,
which recogizes that evidence may be admissible for one purpose, but
not another.
19. Id. at 1080.
20. Id. at 1082. See FLA. STAT. § 90.408 (2006); FLA. STAT, § 768.041(3) (2006). Section
90.402 of Florida's Evidence Code is also used to exclude evidence of settlement if such
evidence is irrelevant. There is also a confidentiality privilege for statements made during
mediation. See FLA. STAT. § 44.403-44.406 (2006).
21. FLA. STAT. § 90.408 (2006).
22. FLA. STAT. § 768.041(3) (2006); see Saleeby, 3 So. 3d at 1083.
23. Saleeby, 3 So. 3d at 1083.
24. FLA. STAT. § 90.408 (2006).
25. See EHRHARDT, supra note 1, § 408.1; see infra Part III.B.2.
26. FLA. STAT. § 90.107 (2006).
2010]1
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The language of Section 90.408 is similar, but not identical, to
Federal Rule of Evidence 408.27 Rule 408 also prohibits admission of
settlement evidence introduced to prove liability, invalidity, or the
amount of a claim.28 However, there are two significant differences
between the wording of Florida's section 90.408 and that of its federal
counterpart. First, the Federal Rule explicitly states that it "does not
require exclusion if the evidence is offered for [a proper purpose]."29
This language affirmatively permits the admission of settlement
evidence when offered for a purpose other than to prove liability, such
as to negate a contention of undue delay or to expose the alleged
obstruction of a criminal investigation. 0 Second, specifically included
in Federal Rule 408's list of permissible uses of settlement evidence is
"proving a witness's bias or prejudice." 31 All of this language is absent
from the Florida provision.
Nevertheless, the ultimate interpretations of Federal Rule 408 and
Florida Evidence Code Section 90.408 are coterminous. This is because
Florida Evidence Code "Section 90.107 recognizes that evidence may
be inadmissible when offered for one purpose, but admissible when
offered for another." 32 Furthermore, Section 90.608 provides that
"[s]howing that the witness is biased" is a proper purpose for the
admission of evidence. 33
Evidence of settlement is thus admissible under both federal and
Florida evidence law if it is admitted for a proper purpose-such as to
show bias-and its probative value is not substantially outweighed by
any prejudicial effect.34 In addition, the party objecting to such evidence
is entitled to a limiting instruction so that the jury only uses the
evidence to decipher the credibility of the witness, and not as evidence
of liability." This is the prevailing law in not onl federal 36 and Florida
courts,37 but in the courts of other states, as well.
27. EHRHARDT, supra note 1, § 408.1.
28. FED. R. EVID. 408(a).
29. Id. at 408(b).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. EHRHARDT, supra note 1, § 408.1.
33. FLA. STAT. § 90.608 (2006).
34. FED. R. EvID. 403; FLA. STAT. § 90.403 (2006).
35. FED. R. EvID. 105; FLA. STAT. § 90.107 (2006).
36. See, e.g., Kennon v. Slipstreamer, Inc., 794 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that no
abuse of discretion to admit evidence of settlement to avoid confusion regarding the absence of
defendants.); United States v. Gonzalez, 748 F.2d 74, 78 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that admissions
made during negotiations to settle civil claim were not excluded by Federal Rule 408 because
they were not being offered to prove that a valid civil claim existed.).
37. See, e.g., Charles B. Pitts Real Estate, Inc. v. Hater, 602 So. 2d 961, 963 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1992) (noting that a settlement between a party and a third person may be admissible to
show bias, but under the facts of the case, the settlement was not probative of the issue); State v.
[Vol. 21344
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2. Florida Statutes Section 768.041(3)
Florida Statutes Section 768.041(3) is part of the chapter entitled
"Negligence." Section 768.041(3) provides that "[t]he fact of . . . a
release or covenant not to sue, or that any defendant has been dismissed
by order of the court shall not be made known to the jury."3 9 This
section aims to prevent the prejudice that is likely to result from the
revelation of a third-party settlement in a tort action tried before a40jury. Specifically, Section 768.041(3) prevents defendants from
unduly influencing the amount of damages awarded (1) by showing that
the plaintiff has already been adequately compensated by the settling
defendant or (2) by insinuating that the settling defendant was solely to
blame for the pending suit.4 1 Section 768.041(3) thus protects plaintiffs
from defendants' improper references to settlements, suspected
settlements, or "empty chair" arguments that imply a lucrative monetary
arrangement with the "real" wrongdoers. 42
Conversely, the statute also protects defendants in tort actions from
Castellano, 460 So. 2d 480, 481 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that threats made in course
of mediation before Citizens Dispute Settlement Program and offered in criminal proceeding
were not excluded by section 90.408 because the evidence was not being offered to prove
liability for the matter being compromised and mediated); Mortgage Guarantee Ins. Corp. v.
Stewart, 427 So. 2d 776, 780 n.2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (noting that "[t]he settlement,
however, may be admissible at trial for other purposes apart from an admission against
interest"); see also infra Part III.B. 1.
38. See, e.g., Schafer v. RMS Realty, 741 N.E.2d 155, 192 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) (noting
that settlement evidence is admissible when offered to show witness bias); TCA Bldg. Co. v.
Northwestern Ress. Co., 922 S.W.2d 629, 636 (Tex. App. 1996); Conley v. Treasurer of Mo.,
999 S.W. 2d 269, 275 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that settlement evidence is admissible to
show percentage of disability from last injury); Brothers v. Pub. Sch. Emps. of Wash., 945 P.2d
208, 212 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (noting that settlement evidence is not excluded when offered
for another purpose such as showing bias or prejudice).
39. FLA. STAT, § 768.041(3) (2006); see Saleeby v. Rocky Elson Constr., Inc., 3 So. 3d
1078, 1083 (Fla. 2009).
40. Saleeby, 3 So. 3d at 1084-85.
41. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Higgins, 788 So. 2d 992, 1006-07 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2001); Muhammad v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 668 So. 2d 254, 256 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Black
v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 581 So. 2d 624, 625 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Rowe v. Leichter,
561 So. 2d 647, 648 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Ellis v. Weisbrot, D.D.S., 550 So. 2d 15, 16
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Charles McArthur Dairies, Inc. v. Morgan, 449 So. 2d 998, 999 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Webb v. Priest, 413 So. 2d 43, 46 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
42. Black v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 581 So. 2d 624, 625 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)
(noting 768.041(3) "prohibits informing the jury that a settlement has been made with the
'empty chair' (a non party responsible for plaintiffs injuries) ... or that the 'empty chair' was
once a defendant in the case, or that there has been a prior action against the empty chair"'). See
also State Farm & Fire Cas. Co., 788 So. 2d at 1006; Muhammad, 668 So. 2d at 255-256;
Webb, 413 So. 2d at 46. Note that Florida courts have recognized that although it is permissible
for a defendant to point to an "empty chair," it is not permissible for a defendant to point out
that the "empty chair" was once a defendant in the case. Id.
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the improper use of prior settlement evidence offered by plaintiffs. In
particular, a plaintiff might argue that the third-party settling
defendant's (apparent or inferred) admission of liability (through
settlement) should be taken as an admission or inference of liability on
the part of the defendant at trial.43 Even though this is not a necessary or
even logical inference, Section 768.041(3) eliminates this potentially
prejudicial line of argument from the case.44 Section 768.041(3) also
protects defendants from the prejudice that would result if the jury were
to learn that the defendant has already settled with another injured party
in the same accident.45 Undoubtedly, if it were aware of such a
settlement, the jury would be inclined to believe that where there has
been payment, there must have been liability.4 6 This inference could
completely destroy the defendant's case. Section 768.041(3) bars this
evidence.
Unlike Florida Evidence Code Section 90.408, Section 768.041(3)
appears to be a categorical prohibition against the admission of the fact
of settlement in all tort cases. However, this is neither a necessary nor
the preferred interpretation of this provision.
B. Florida Case Law Regarding the Admissibility of
Settlement Evidence
1. Pre-Saleeby Decision-Making Process: Means Determined Ends
Prior to the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Saleeby, no Florida
court had ever considered the effect that Sections 768.041(3) and
90.408 would have if applied simultaneously to evaluate the
admissibility of settlement evidence. Instead, courts would treat the
admissibility question as answerable through application of either the
tort statute or the evidence rule. Regardless of which provision they
chose, they appeared oblivious to the other's existence. And yet, their
choice of legal authority was effectively outcome-determinative. If the
43. Glasgow, supra note 3, at 89 (noting that submitting evidence of a prior settlement to
a jury may prejudice an unreleased defendant because "the jury might imply his negligence from
the virtual admission of negligence" by the released defendant). See also Cynthia A. Sharo,
Note, Knowledge by the Jury of a Settlement Where a Plaintiff has Settled with One or More
Defendants who are Jointly and Severally Liable, 32 VILL. L. REv. 541, 557-58 (1987) (citing
Luth v. Rogers, 507 P.2d 761 (Alaska 1973), Brewer v. Payless Stations, Inc., 316 N.W.2d 702
(1982)); Glasgow, supra note 3, at 97.
44. See Sharo, supra note 42, at 557-58; Glasgow, supra note 3, at 97.
45. City of Coral Gables v. Jordan, 186 So. 2d 60, 62 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), af'd, 191 So.
2d 38 (Fla. 1966). The court noted that "[i]t would seem to be just as damaging to a fair trial to
permit the injured party to reveal to the jury that the alleged tort feasor has settled with another
injured party in the same accident." Id. See infra Part Ill.B.2.
46. Jordan, 186 So. 2d at 63.
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court viewed the question as a matter addressed by the Evidence Code,
it would traditionally exclude the settlement evidence under Section
90.408 only when it was improperly offered to prove "liability or
absence of liability."A7 The court would admit such evidence if it was
offered for some other proper purpose.48 If the court viewed the
question as a matter of tort law, it would categorically exclude the
evidence based on Section 768.041(3).
2. Use of Florida Evidence Code Section 90.408
For example, in Wolowitz v. Thouroughbred Motors, Inc., 49 Charles
Wolowitz challenged the admission of pretrial settlement negotiations,
claiminf this evidence should have been excluded under Section
90.408. The Second District Court of Appeal denied Wolowitz's
claim, reasoning that Section 90.408 only excludes evidence of
settlement negotiations "when the evidence is offered to prove liability,
the absence of liability, or value."51 Based on the record in the case, the
court concluded that the settlement recommendations might have been
admissible to establish other relevant facts. 52 Accordingly, the court
remanded the case back to the trial court to determine whether the
settlement evidence addressed issues other than liability and value.53
Similarly, in Bankers Trust Co. v. Basciano,54 the Fifth District
Court of Appeal explained that "[i]f the evidence is offered for another
purpose [other than to prove liability or value], the evidence is not
barred by Section 90.408 and will be admissible if it is relevant to prove
a material fact or issue. . . ."ss In Bankers Trust Co., a hotel defaulted on
a loan held by Bankers Trust.56 Following the default, Bankers Trust
47. See EHRHARDT, supra note 1, § 408.1.
48. Id. (citing Charles B. Pitts Real Estate, Inc. v. Hater, 602 So. 2d 961, 963 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1992) (noting that "[a] [s]ettlement between a party and a third person may be
admissible to show bias, but under the facts of the case the settlement was not probative of the
issue"); State v. Castellano, 460 So. 2d 480, 481 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (noting that "threats
made in course of mediation before Citizens Dispute Settlement Program and offered in
criminal proceeding are not excluded by section 90.408 because "[t]he evidence was not being
offered to prove liability for the matter being compromised and mediated"); Mortgage
Guarantee Ins. Corp. v. Stewart, 427 So. 2d 776, 780 n.2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (noting that
"[t]he settlement, however, may be admissible at trial for other purposes apart from an
admission against interest")).
49. 765 So. 2d 920 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
50. Id. at 925.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. 960 So. 2d 773, 780 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 775.
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executed pre-negotiation agreements designed to govern any loan
restructuring negotiations between Bankers Trust and the hotel.5 7 At
trial, the president of the hotel claimed that the pre-negotiation
agreements were binding only on the hotel and not on him individually,
as the hotel's representative. Banker's Trust attempted to impeach the
president by showing that he had represented himself as the hotel's
representative in the pre-negotiation agreements. 59 The trial court did
not permit Bankers Trust to introduce the agreements, concluding they
were settlement proposals, excludable under Section 90.408.o
On appeal, the court ruled that the trial court erred in excluding the
agreements.6 1 The court reasoned that because Section 90.408 only
excludes evidence offered to prove liability or absence thereof, the
statute did not apply in this case.62 According to the court, the letters
were crucial to determining whether the hotel president was acting as a
representative of the borrower, a fact that was material to resolving the
dispute and therefore should not have been excluded.63
3. Use of Florida Tort Statute Prohibiting Settlement Evidence
By contrast, when pre-Saleeby Florida courts saw the matter as
controlled by Section 768.041(3), they generally ruled the other way-
excluding settlement evidence even when offered to demonstrate a
witness's bias. In Ellis v. Weisbrot,64 for example, Darryl Ellis sued
Jefferson Stores, Inc., and Drs. Kirsner and Weisbrot for dental
malpractice. Ellis dismissed Dr. Kirsner, but called him as a witness at
trial. 65 During cross-examination, against Ellis's objection Dr. Kirsner
admitted he had previously been a defendant in the case. Throughout
the cross-examination, Dr. Weisbrot's attorney continuously referred to
Dr. Kirsner's former status as a defendant. 67 The trial court allowed Dr.
Kisner's testimony to be admitted.68
The Third District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded the case
for a new trial. 69 The court reasoned that Florida Statutes Section
57. Id.
58. Id. at 779.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 780.
63. Id
64. 550 So.2d 15, 16 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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768.041(3) "prohibits informing the jury that a witness was a prior
defendant, whether the party was dismissed by release or settlement or
by court order." 70 The "[a]dmission of such testimony, even to attack
the former defendant's credibility, is clear error and requires reversal." 7'
Several other Third District Court of Appeal cases specificall held
that disclosure of a previous settlement was reversible error7  even
when used to demonstrate bias on the part of a testifying witness.73 in
Ashby Division of Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. Dobkin,74 Irving
Dobkin, a plumber, was injured when he fell off of a ladder
manufactured by Consolidated Aluminum Corporation (Consolidated)
while repairing Robert Silverman's house. 5 Dobkin sued both
Consolidated and Silverman but settled with Silverman before trial.76 At
trial, Consolidated informed the jury of Silverman's settlement with
Dobkin.7 7 On appeal, Dobkin contended that it was error to tell the jury
that Silverman had previously been a defendant in the lawsuit.7 8 Relying
on Section 768.041(3), the court held that the trial court did indeed err
in permitting Consolidated to introduce evidence of the settlement.79
The court noted, however, that although settlement evidence is
generally not admissible, it may be introduced in unusual
circumstances, but that no unusual circumstances were present in this
case.80
Other Florida courts have protected plaintiffs from the prejudicial
implication that a prior defendant who settled is solely responsible for
the plaintiffs injuries." In Vucinich v. Ross,82 for example, the Fifth
District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's order granting a new
trial to defendants after statements were made implying a settlement had
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Ashby Div. of Consol. Aluminum Corp. v. Dobkin, 458 So. 2d 335, 336-37 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1984); Green v. Ed Ricke & Sons, Inc., 438 So. 2d 25, 27 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983),
approved, 468 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1985); Webb v. Priest, 413 So. 2d 43, 46 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1982); City of Coral Gables v. Jordan, 186 So. 2d 60, 62-63 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), aff'd, 191 So.
2d 38 (Fla. 1966).
73. Initial Brief, supra note 12, at 17.
74. 458 So. 2d 335 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
75. Id. at 336.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 337.
81. See Muhammad v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 668 So. 2d 254, 256 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996);
Black v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 581 So. 2d 624, 625 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Webb v.
Priest, 413 So. 2d 43, 46 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
82. 893 So. 2d 690 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
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been reached. In Vucinich, Dudley Baringer and Janice Vucinich were
84 8sued for negligence. Baringer settled prior to trial.ss At trial,
Vucinich's counsel made comments that could have implied to the jury
that Baringer had settled.86 Specifically, Vucinich asserted that "[i]t is
not an issue . . . what Dr. Baringer did; whether you draw any
conclusions . . . from his absence here . . . [because n]o part of the
verdict will ever be paid by [him]." The court concluded that these
statements "not only emphasized that there was an empty chair by
discussing the parties' absence, but insinuated that the plaintiff was
responsible for their absence and was improperly withholding an
explanation. "8 8 Accordingly, the court affirmed the order granting a new
trial.89
Florida courts have also used Section 768.041(3) to protect
defendants against the improper use of settlement evidence by plaintiffs.
For example, in City of Coral Gables v. Jordan, a motor scooter
passenger died when the scooter collided with a vehicle at an
intersection where a police officer was directing traffic. 9' The
deceased's mother sued the city for damages predicated upon the
negligence of the city's police officer.92 The issue before the court was
whether evidence of the city's settlement with the driver of the motor
scooter was admissible at trial.93 The court held that, pursuant to Section
768.041(3),94 the evidence was inadmissible at trial.9 5 The court
reasoned that knowledge of the settlement between the driver and the
city was "immediately and completely destructive to the possibility of a
fair trial" for the defendant. 9 The city intended to show that the
deceased died solely through the negligent acts of the driver of the
motor scooter.97 Once the jury knew the city had settled with the driver,
the city's "defense that the [driver] was the sole cause of the accident
83. Id. at 691-92, 696.
84. Id. at 691.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 692.
87. Id
88. Id. at 692-93 (citing Ricks v. Loyola, 822 So. 2d 502 (Fla. 2002)).
89. Id. at 696.
90. 186 So. 2d 60 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), aff'd, 191 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 1966).
91. Id. at 61.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. When this case was decided, Section 768.041 was Florida Statutes Section 54.28
(1963). Saleeby v. Rocky Elson Constr., Inc., 3 So. 3d 1078, 1085 n.4. (Fla. 2009).
95. City of Coral Gables v. Jordan, 186 So. 2d 60, 63 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), affd, 191 So.
2d 38 (Fla. 1966).
96. Id. at 62.
97. Id. at 62-63.
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evaporated." 9 8 As a result, the court reasoned that exclusion of the
evidence was "in accordance with reason and justice."99 Although the
court recognized that other courts permit such evidence as long as it
goes to the witness's credibility and not to the witness's liability, the
court reasoned that "it is a practical impossibility to eradicate from the
jury's minds the consideration that where there has been a payment
there must have been liability." 00 Accordingly, the court held that the
rule permitting payments to a witness to be shown for the purpose of
determining whether such payments affect credibility must yield to
Section 768.041(3) except under unusual circumstances, such as where
there is fraud or other questionable practice.' 0'
C. The "Special" Case ofDosdourian v. Carsten
In Dosdourian v. Carsten,102 the Florida Supreme Court did permit
evidence of settlement to be admitted despite Section 786.041(3)'s
apparent blanket prohibition against such evidence. In Dosdourian,
Carsten sued DeMario and Dosdourian for negligence.103 Shortly before
trial, Carsten settled with DeMario but required that DeMario remain a
defendant in the lawsuit.104 The issue before the court was whether a
non-settling defendant may inform the jury of a settlement agreement
between the plaintiff and another defendant who was required to
continue to participate in the lawsuit.' 0 5 The agreement in Dosdourian
closely resembled a Mary Carter Agreement, "a contract by which one
co-defendant secretly agrees with the plaintiff that, if such defendant
will proceed to defend himself in court, his own maximum liability will
be diminished proportionately by increasing the liability of the other co-
defendants."' 0
Before addressing the issue, the Court first outlawed Mary Carter
Agreements in Florida. 0 7 Recognizing that such agreements were legal
in Florida prior to its ruling, the Court decided Dosdourian "upon the
premise that the settlement agreement was legal." 08 The Court then
considered whether DeMario's settlement agreement should have been
98. Id at 63.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. 624 So. 2d 241 (Fla. 1993).
103. Id. at 242; see also Saleeby v. Rocky Elson Constr., Inc., 3 So. 3d 1078, 1084 (Fla.
2009).
104. Dosdourian, 624 So. 2d at 242-43; see also Saleeby, 3 So. 3d at 1084.
105. Dosdourian, 624 So. 2d; see also Saleeby, 3 So. 3d at 1083.
106. Dosdourian, 624 So. 2d at 243; see also Saleeby, 3 So. 3d at 1083.
107. Dosdourian, 624 So. 2d at 246.
108. Id.
2010] 351
HeinOnline  -- 21 U. Fla. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 351 2010
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY
disclosed to the jury.10 9
Carsten claimed his settlement agreement was protected from
disclosure to the jury pursuant to 768.041(3).no The Court did not apply
Section 768.041(3), but instead decided the case under the Mary Carter
line of cases.' The Court reasoned that "the same policy reasons
requiring the disclosure of secret settlement [agreements] in the 'Mary
Carter' line of cases apply[,] . . . even though the motivations of the
settling parties are not as clear."ll 2 The Court noted the "integrity of our
justice system is placed in question when a jury charged to determine
the liability and damages of the parties is deprived of the knowledge
that there is, in fact, no actual dispute between two out of three of the
parties."" 3 Furthermore, the Court explained that "the jury was entitled
to weigh the codefendant's actions in light of its knowledge that such a
settlement has been reached."ll 4 Therefore, the Court concluded, the
agreement had to be disclosed to the jury. 5
IV. SALEEBY's HOLDING AND REASONING
In deciding Saleeby, the Florida Supreme Court found direct conflict
between Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeal in Saleeby and
Florida's Third District Court of Appeal in Ellis regarding the
admissibility of settlement evidence to demonstrate the bias of a
testifying witness. 116 The Third District Court of Appeal excluded the
prior defendant's testimony as to his status as a prior defendant,"' while
the Fourth District Court of Appeal admitted such evidence to show a
witness' bias, relying on Dosdourian. In resolving the conflict, the
Court rejected the Fourth District's decision in Saleeby and approved
the Third District's decision in Ellis.19
The specific issue before the Court was whether evidence of
settlement may be admitted to impeach a witness's testimony.120 The
Court ruled that the plain language of Sections 768.041(3) and 90.408
109. Id. at 247.
110. Id
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. (quoting Dosdourian v. Carsten, 580 So. 2d 869, 872 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)).
114. Id. at 247 n.4.
115. Id at 247.
116. Saleeby v. Rocky Elson Constr., Inc., 3 So. 3d 1078, 1081-82. (Fla. 2009).
117. Ellis v. Weisbrot, 550 So. 2d 15, 16 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
118. Saleeby v. Rocky Elson Constr., Inc., 965 So. 2d 211, 215 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007),
rev'd, 3 So. 3d 1078 (Fla. 2009).
119. Saleeby, 3 So. 3d at 1086.
120. Id. at 1080.
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prohibit the admission of evidence of settlement of a prior defendant or
dismissal of a defendant even when such evidence is offered to show
bias or prejudice.1 21 In its analysis, the Court distinguished Saleeby
from its prior decision in Dosdourian.122 Unlike in Dosdourian, the
Court reasoned, the settling defendant in Saleeby, Al, was dismissed
from the action and did not continue to participate as a defendant in the
case.123 As a result, the Court was not concerned with the potential
fraud and unseemly appearance of collusion that generally accompanies
Mary Carter Agreements.124
The Court also noted that Sections 768.041(3) and 90.408 both
promote Florida's public policy favoring settlement and excluding
prejudicial evidence at trial. 12 5 Furthermore, the Court reasoned that
neither statute contains an exception that permits settlement evidence to
be used for impeachment purposes.12 6 The Court thus concluded that the
evidence showing Herring had entered into a settlement with Saleeby
was inadmissible, even if it demonstrated Herring's bias or self-
interest.127 After deciding that the trial court admitted the evidence of
settlement in direct violation of Sections 768.041(3) and 90.408, the
Court found the violation to be a reversible error. Accordingly, it
granted Saleeby a new trial.129
V. ANALYSIS
A. The Court Disregarded the Plain Language ofSection 90.408, Which
Does Not Expressly Prohibit the Admission of Settlement Evidence at
Trial When it is Offered for a Proper Purpose
The Saleeby decision prohibits a party from introducing settlement
evidence to demonstrate witness bias or prejudice, yet the Court failed
to provide an "rational[e] or language ... to support that
interpretation."' 0 In Saleeby, the Court stated that the facts "fall
entirely within the purview and prohibitions of Sections 786.041 and
90.408,"31 yet it completely disregarded the plain language in
121. Id. at 1083, 1086.
122. Id. at 1084.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1083-84.
126. Id. at 1086.
127. See EHRHARDT, supra note 1, § 408.1.
128. Saleeby, 3 So. 3d at 1086.
129. Id. at 1085.
130. EHRHARDT, supra note 1, § 408.1.
131. Saleeby, 3 So. 3d at 1084.
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numerous provisions of Florida's Evidence Code that provide an
exception for the specific situation presented in the case.
The Florida Supreme Court has repeatedly held that "the plain
meaning of statutory language is the first consideration of statutory
construction."l32 In reaching its conclusion in Saleeby, however, the
Court failed to address the plain language of Section 90.408 "which
bars the admissibility of the evidence only when the evidence is offered
to prove 'liability or the absence of liability' for the claim.133 Section
90.408, by its express terms, is designed to permit the introduction of
settlement evidence when offered for a proper purpose.134 Despite this
plain language, the Saleeby Court incorrectly stated that Section 90.408
"expressly prohibit[s] the [admission of settlement evidence] . . . from
being transmitted to the jury at all." 35
The Saleeby Court also failed to discuss the plain meaning of other
critical sections of Florida's Evidence Code, including Section 90.107,
which allows otherwise inadmissible evidence to be admissible if
offered for a proper purpose;136 and Section 90.608, which allows any
party to attack a witness's credibility by "[s]howing that the witness is
biased." 37 These statutory provisions should not have been ignored by
the Court in its analysis. When reading Section 90.408 in concert
with the rest of Florida's Evidence Code, it is clear that settlement
evidence should be admissible if it is offered for a proper purpose,
which clearly includes proof of a witness's alleged bias. Such a readin
is consistent with the long history of Florida case law on point.
Because the Court failed to discuss these previous Florida appellate
decisions, Saleeby needlessly "casts into doubt the numerous decisions
which approve the admissibility of settlements and compromises to
prove other relevant facts or issues" aside from liability.140
Furthermore, as part of Florida's Evidence Code, Section 90.408 can
132. Jones v. State, 813 So. 2d 22, 24 (Fla. 2002) (citing State v. Bradford, 787 So. 2d 811,
817 (Fla. 2001)).
133. See EHRHARDT, supra note 1, § 408.1 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 90.408 (2006)); Saleeby,
3 So. 3d at 1090 (Polston, J., dissenting).
134. See FLA. STAT. § 90.408 (2006).
135. Saleeby, 3 So. 3d at 1086 (emphasis added).
136. FLA. STAT. § 90.107 (2006).
137. Id. § 90.608 (2006).
138. Saleeby, 3 So. 3d at 1086 (Canady, J., dissenting).
139. See City of Coral Gables v. Jordan, 186 So. 2d 60, 64 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) af'd, 191
So. 2d 38 (Fla. 1966) (Hendry, J., dissenting); Saleeby, 3 So. 3d at 1090 (Polston, J., dissenting)
(quoting FLA. STAT. § 90.107 (2006)); Breedlove v. State, 413 So. 2d 1, 6 (Fla. 1982); Bankers
Trust Co. v. Basciano, 960 So. 2d 773, 780 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007); Wolowitz v.
Thoroughbred Motors, Inc., 765 So. 2d 920, 925 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000), Agan v. Katzman &
Korr, P.A. 328 F. Supp. 2d 1363, 1371-72 (S.D. Fla. 2004)). See also supra Part HI.B.1.
140. See EHRHARDT, supra note 1, § 408.1.
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give way to other evidentiary considerations, like truth finding. The
"evidence rules should set the stage for a fair trial, one in which the
truth can be impartially ascertained."'41 Numerous Florida courts have
held that the purpose behind the rules of evidence is to elicit and
establish the truth and allow the jury to ascertain the truth.142 The U.S.
Supreme Court also recognized long ago that "[t]he fundamental basis
upon which all rules of evidence must rest-if they are to rest upon
reason-is their adaptation to the successful development of the
truth." 43
Although the degree of concealed bias in Saleeby may not constitute
outright deception of the jury, the categorical holding appears to shield
all future settlement agreements from juries, no matter how collusive
they are, and no matter how overwhelming and obvious the settling
defendant's bias might be. Accordingly, Saleeby is an invitation for
parties to deceive juries and hide the truth by using witnesses who may
be severely biased and prejudiced due to settlement of a claim, but who
are now immune from cross-examination on those grounds. As a result,
the Saleeby Court's disregard for truth considerations contradicts the
objectives of Florida's evidentiary rules by infringing on the jury's
ability to ascertain the truth.
B. The Court Failed to Adequately Analyze the Purpose and Function of
Florida Statutes, Sections 90.408 and 786.041(3)
1. Purposes of the Two Provisions
Sections 768.041(3) and 90.408 serve two very different functions.
Nevertheless, the Saleeby Court lumped the two statutes together and
proffered a broad policy to explain them both: the promotion of
Florida's public policy favoring settlement and excluding prejudicial
evidence at trial.' This superficial explanation for Sections 786.041(3)
and 90.408 fails to account for the real and specific purposes motivating
these statutory provisions. A more exacting examination of this issue
helps one to understand when they can and should give way to other
considerations.
141. James B. Dolan, Jr., Crediting Payments by Concurring Tortfeasors: the Decline and
Fall of the Jury Rule?, 65 DEF. COUNS. J. 389, 398 (1998).
142. See Amos v. Gunn, 94 So. 615, 649 (Fla. 1922) (Browne, C.J., concurring in part &
dissenting in part); Westerheide v. State, 831 So. 2d 93, 102 (Fla. 2002); Atlantic Coast Line
R.R. Co. v. Campbell, 139 So. 886, 890 (Fla. 1932); Ulrich v. Coast Dental Servs., Inc., 739 So.
2d 142, 143 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
143. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S 399, 411 (1998) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(quoting Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 381 (1933)).
144. Saleeby, 3 So. 3d at 1082-83.
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Similar to its federal counterpart, the function of Florida Rule of
Evidence Section 90.408 is to create a protected environment to
encourage private settlements.14 5 By permitting parties to openly engage
in settlement negotiations without fear that their statements will be
admitted into evidence as an admission of liability, the rule advances
the judicial preference and public policy of reducing lawsuits and
promoting private settlements.146 Moreover, because the provision
ensures that statements cannot later be used to prove liability, Section
90.408 improves communication and understanding between the parties
during settlement discussions. With this statutory protection, parties are
more apt to talk with one another and seek a mutually beneficial
resolution to their dispute through frank and honest discourse.
On the other hand, the purpose of Section 768.041(3) is significantly
different. Most crucially, Section 768.041(3) is not a rule of evidence.
Rather, it appears in the portion of the Florida Statutes governing
negligence actions; it strictly pertains to the revelation of third-party
settlements to juries in this context. Section 786.041(3) is designed to
protect parties in tort cases from the prejudice that would result from
allowing either a plaintiff or a defendant to use evidence of an absent
party's settlement as a way to infer liability or lack thereof.147
In Saleeby, the Court quoted with approval the Third District Court
of Appeal's decision in Jordan, stating "[it] is a practical impossibility
to eradicate from the jury's minds the considerations that where there
has been a payment there must have been liability." 48 In essence, the
jury may treat a prior settlement as an admission of liability by the
settling defendant and, depending on which party is offering the
evidence at trial, infer that the non-settling defendant is either not liable
(because the real wrongdoer has fully compensated plaintiff) or is liable
145. Fed. R. Evid. 408 advisory committee's note. "The purpose of this rule is to encourage
[private] settlements which would be discouraged if such evidence were admissible." Id.
146. See City of Coral Gables v. Jordan, 186 So. 2d 60, 63 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966) affd,
191 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 1966). ("The public policy of this state favors amicable settlement of
disputes and the avoidance of litigation.").
147. Muhammad v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 668 So. 2d 254, 256 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)
(holding that defense counsel's comments suggesting the possibility of a settlement between the
plaintiff and a prior defendant were "patently prejudicial [to plaintiff] and may have influenced
the jury to return a verdict in favor of [defendant]); Ellis v. Weisbrot, D.D.S., 550 So. 2d 15, 16
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (defendant's continual references to Dr. Kirsner's former status as a
defendant was prohibited under Section 768.041); Charles McArthur Dairies, Inc. v. Morgan,
449 So. 2d 998, 999 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that a "settlement amount with any one
party should not be announced to the jury, as it may unduly influence them as to the amount of
damages"); City of Coral Gables v. Jordan, 186 So. 2d 60, 62, 64 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), af'd,
191 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 1966) (holding that a plaintiffs reference to a defendant's settlement with
the other injured party was so prejudicial to the defendant as to require a mistrial).
148. Saleeby, 3. So. 3d at 1085 (citing Jordan, 186 So. 2d at 63).
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(just like the wrongdoer who admitted to it).149 In either case, the
settlement evidence is prejudicial as it raises unfair and potentially
irrational inferences.
Although both parties may abuse settlement evidence typically
plaintiffs are more likely to be harmed than helped by it. As one
commentator noted, plaintiffs
usually display fear and loathing at the prospect of settlement
evidence being disclosed to the jury . . . [b]ecause . . . [t]hey
know that one of the best ways to create sympathy for a seriously
injured plaintiff is to make the jury believe that prevailing against
the defendant at the trial is the plaintiffs only chance for
compensation. 151
By the same token, "[t]he converse is also true. One of the best ways
to defeat sympathy and focus the jury on the merits is to show that the
plaintiff has already been paid." 5 2
Therefore, although the Saleeby Court was correct in stating that the
overall public policy behind Section 768.041(3) is to encourage
settlements, the Court failed to notice a more critical point: the statute's
more specific aim is to protect parties in a tort suit from the misuse of
settlement evidence by its opponent at trial.
149. See Sharo, supra note 42, at 556-58 (discussing cases where courts have found that
settlement evidence is prejudicial to both the plaintiff and the defendant) (citing Luth v. Rogers,
507 P.2d 761, 768 (Alaska 1973); Brewer v. Payless Stations, Inc., 316 N.W.2d 702 (Mich.
1982). The Luth court stated that the jury's knowledge of the prior settlement can prejudice the
plaintiff and the defendant. Luth, 507 P.2d at 768. The non-settling defendant is prejudiced if the
jury imputes his negligence by what the jury believes is a virtual admission of negligence by the
settling defendant. Id. To the contrary, the plaintiff may be prejudiced if the jury believes the
settlement is evidence of the settling defendant's complete liability and the defendant's freedom
from liability. Id. In Brewer, the plaintiff argued that if the jury believes the settlement is as an
admission of liability by the settling defendant, the jury may find the responsible party has
settled and the plaintiff is not entitled to further relief. Brewer, 316 N.W.2d at 704. On the other
hand, the court reasoned that the jury might infer the plaintiffs settlement with the settling
defendant suggests the non-settling defendant is responsible as well. Id. at 705.
150. Seemingly most of the Florida district court cases excluding evidence pursuant to
Section 768.041(3) do so on grounds that it is prejudicial to the plaintiff. See, e.g., Vucinich v.
Ross, 893 So. 2d 690, 694 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Higgins,
788 So. 2d 992, 1007 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); Muhammad v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 668 So. 2d
254, 256 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Ellis v. Weisbrot, 550 So. 2d 15, 16 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1989); Webb v. Priest, 413 So. 2d 43, 46 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
151. Dolan, supra note 137, at 397.
152. Id.
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2. Once a Party Uses the Settlement Evidence Protection as
a Sword, It can no Longer use it as a Shield
Here is the critical point missed by the Florida Supreme Court in its
interpretation of Section 768.041(3): because that provision is designed
to protect a tort litigant from the misuse of settlement evidence by its
opponent, the protection should lose its categorical nature when the
litigant decides to make the credibility of a settling defendant an issue
in the case by calling the settling defendant as a witness. In other words,
a party should not be permitted to use the 768.041(3) shield as a sword
against a disarmed opponent. By calling the settling defendant to the
stand, the sponsoring party has put that defendant's credibility into play.
Central to our system of justice is the notion that a jury should be
permitted to evaluate each and every witness for potential problems of
bias, interest, prejudice, and corruption.15 3 The fact that the witness was
once a defendant who settled pretrial or was otherwise dismissed from
the lawsuit might very well impact his credibility, perhaps in a
significant way. Of course, given Section 768.041(3)'s prohibition,
inquiry on cross-examination about these matters should not be
automatic. Rather, whether to admit this evidence should be a
discretionary call that the judge makes under Section 90.403.154 At a
minimum, however-and contrary to the Saleeby holding-a trial judge
should have the discretion to allow cross-examination about the prior
153. See EHRHARDT, supra note 1, § 608.1:
All witnesses who testify during a trial place their credibility in issue.
Regardless of the subject matter of the witness's testimony, a party on cross-
examination may inquire into matters that affect the truthfulness of the
witness's testimony [because] the credibility of the witness is always a
proper subject of cross-examination.
See also Minus v. State, 901 So. 2d 344, 348 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (noting that the
"'exposure of a witness' motivation in testifying is a proper and important function .. . of cross-
examination"') (citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974)); Russ v. City of
Jacksonville, 734 So. 2d 508, 511 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (noting that "the credibility, bias or
prejudice of witnesses who testify in a case, as well as the weight to be given their testimony,
are a matter for the consideration of and determination by the jury").
154. See Saleeby v. Rocky Elson Constr. Co., 3 So. 3d 1078, 1987 (Canady, J., dissenting)
(noting that "[a] reasonable judge could decide that the 'probative value' of the evidence of A-
l's prior status as a defendant was not 'substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice') (quoting § 90.403, FLA. STAT. (2006)); Caruso v. State, 645 So. 2d 389, 394-95
(Fla. 1994) (noting that "the evidence [of bias] is subject to exclusion if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of confusing the issues, unfair prejudice, misleading the
jury, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence"); Lee v. State, 422 So. 2d 928, 931 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1982), petition for review denied, 431 So. 2d 989 (Fla. 1983) (noting "evidence of
bias may be inadmissible when it creates a danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
misleading of the jury, or results in a needless presentation of cumulative evidence").
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settlement if the circumstances warrant it.'5 5
What gives the trial judge the power to ignore the plain language and
apparent categorical prohibition of Section 768.041(3)? First, there is
the simple principle of waiver. Though Section 768.041(3) is written as
an absolute rule, fair play dictates that a party calling a prior defendant
as a witness waives any argument that it is unduly harmed by an
examination into the motivations of the very witness it brought to the
stand, if the probative value of the credibility evidence outweighs the
unfair prejudice of the jury hearing about the settlement. Another way
of considering the issue is through the common notion in the law of
evidence of "door opening." Under the rules of evidence, there are
many situations in which a party, initially protected by an exclusionary
rule, is deemed to have "opened the door" to otherwise inadmissible
evidence by choosing to introduce evidence of a certain type. One
example is character evidence in a criminal case. Florida Evidence Code
Section 90.404(1)(a) bars the prosecution from offering evidence
pertaining to the character of the accused, unless and until the defendant
opens the door to the same. 156
Indeed, there are numerous instances in the law where a categorical
statutory prohibition gives way to other considerations under particular
circumstances. A significant example of this is the doctrine of necessity
in the criminal arena.157 Although a defendant's behavior might
otherwise contravene an express and facially absolute provision of
criminal law, he may nonetheless be found not guilty because, in light
of the peculiar facts of his case, the judqe or jury determines that his
actions constituted the lesser of two evils. 58 The necessity doctrine was
born out of notions of common sense and fundamental fairness.'5 9 The
155. See EHRHARDT, supra note 1, § 608.5 (noting that "[t]he decision whether a particular
question properly goes to interest, bias, or prejudice lies within the discretion of the trialjudge").
156. FLA. STAT. § 90.404(1)(a) (2006).
157. Both Old English and modem American federal court cases recognize the necessity
defense in criminal cases. Edward B. Arnolds & Norman F. Garland, The Defense ofNecessity
in Criminal Law: The Right to Choose the Lesser Evil, 65 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 289,
291-93 (1974). Two famous cases address the doctrine in detail. See United States v. Holmes,
26 F. Cas. 360, 363-69 (No. 15, 383) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842); The Queen v. Dudley & Stephens,
[1884] 14 Q.B.D. 273 at 275-88.
158. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 410 (1980). As an example of the necessity
defense, the Supreme Court stated that if: "[a person] destroyed the dike in order to protect more
valuable property from flooding, [that person] could claim a defense of necessity." Id. See
Amolds & Garland, supra note 153, at 294.
159. United States v. Bailey, 585 F.2d 1087, 1098 (D.C. Cir. 1978), rev'd, 444 U.S. 394
(1980) (noting the necessity defense "justifies the defendant's action: the defendant did the
[r]ight thing, because 'public policy favors the commission of a lesser harm (the commission of
what would otherwise be a crime) when this would avoid a greater harm."' See also Arnolds &
Garland, supra note 153, at 290 (quoting WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. Scorr, HANDBOOK
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same could be said for situations in which an extremely suspect
settlement has taken place and the settling defendant testifies for the
implicated party. Common sense and fairness dictate that, to reach a
proper verdict, the jury must be advised of this fact.
Significantly, the Florida Supreme Court has already recognized
that, in certain situations, the seemingly blanket prohibition of Section
768.041(3) should give way to more important considerations. 160in
Dosdourian, the Court decided that the jury was entitled to hear about
the settlement between a plaintiff and a defendant who remained at
counsel's table despite the rule of exclusion in Section 768.041(3). 161
Moreover, even in cases in which Florida's district courts excluded
evidence of prior settlement pursuant to Section 768.041(3), many have
noted in dicta that, in certain unusual circumstances, Section 768.041(3)
might need to yield to other important policy considerations.1 62 The
Court's fundamental mistake in Saleeby was its failure to provide a
mechanism for the admission of settlement evidence in future cases like
Dosdourian-where the failure to admit such evidence would lead to an
unfair result.
C. Saleeby
In Saleeby, the fact that Saleeby elected to call Herring as a witness
and ask his opinion about the cause of the accident-as opposed to
calling a qualified expert-is a critical factor the Florida Supreme Court
inexplicably failed to address.1 63 Under the analysis proposed herein, by
oN CRIMINAL LAw 378 (1972)).
160. Saleeby v. Rocky Elston Constr. Co., Inc., 3 So. 3d 1078, 1086, 3 So. 3d at 1086
(Canady, J., dissenting) (noting that Dosdourian v. Carsten, 624 So. 2d 241 (Fla. 1993) "clearly
established the point that the rule of exclusion in Section 768.041(3) is not invariably applied in
derogation of other applicable rules or principles of law")).
161. Dosdourian v. Carsten, 624 So. 2d 241, 247 (Fla. 1993).
162. See, e.g., City of Coral Gables v. Jordan, 186 So. 2d 60, 63 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), af'd,
191 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 1966) ("We are of the opinion that the more substantial authority supports
the conclusion that the rule permitting payments to a witness to be shown for the purpose of
determining whether such payments affect credibility must yield to ... [Section 768.041(3)] ...
except under unusual circumstances.") (emphasis added); Ashby Div. of Consol. Aluminum
Corp. v. Dobkin, 458 So. 2d 335, 337 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (noting that that although
settlement evidence is generally not admissible under 768.041(3), it may be introduced in
unusual circumstances, but that no unusual circumstances were present in the case).
163. Interestingly, the trial court permitted Herring to provide his opinion on causation
despite the fact that he was never formally tendered as an expert. See Saleeby, 3 So. 3d at 1080-
81. The Saleeby majority thus treats Herring as a routine fact witness in its analysis, while the
dissent argues that he was, in effect, testifying as an expert-which added to the overall
prejudice. Id. at 1086 (noting that "[i]n this case, Herring was called as a fact witness"); cf
Saleeby, 3 So. 3d at 1087 (Canady, J., dissenting) (noting that "prior status as a defendant was
highly probative on the issue of Herring's credibility as an expert witness on causation")
(emphasis added).
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making the tactical decision to bring Herring to the stand and ask him
for his opinion about the remaining defendants' liability, Saleeby
waived any argument that Section 768.041(3) categorically protected
him from revealing any evidence of settlement. 16 "All witnesses who
testify during a trial place their credibility at issue, . . . [and as a result,]
... the credibility of the witness is always a proper subject of cross-
examination."' As Justice Canady stated in dissent, Saleeby
unilaterally chose to use Herring as a witness. 166 "[A] party who
chooses to present the . . . testimony of a witness whose credibility is
subject to impeachment for bias should not be permitted to use Section
768.041(3) as a cloak to hide from the jury facts relevant to the bias of
that witness."',67
Al's status as a prior defendant was highly probative on the issue of
Herring's credibility by showing that Al was biased.'6 8 Herring's
statement was first given during a deposition when he was still a
defendant in the case; a time when he "had an obvious motivation to
give testimony assigning blame to a defendant other than [Al]." 69
When Herring rendered his opinion, "he had the motivation to exonerate
his own company" and to point to Rocky Elson as the cause of the
accident. Later, while testifying at trial, he had a strong interest in not
contradicting his prior sworn deposition testimony.' 7 '
Additionally, the fact that Saleeby elected to list and call Herring, in
lieu of expert testimony, further distinguishes Saleeby from all prior
cases that prohibited the revelation of a witnesses' prior status as a
defendant.' 2 Saleeby used Herring for his opinion that the manufacture
of the trusses was not a contributing cause of the accident.17 3 "Expert
opinions, by their very nature, carry great weight with a jury because
the court instructs them that this person has been especially qualified to
testify, and the are permitted to opine as to the ultimate issue as though
it were true."' Herring's status as a prior defendant could have easily
given him a reason to be biased in his conclusions regarding the cause
of the accident. Therefore, the jury had even more of a reason to be
informed of his status.175
164. See Answer Brief, supra note 13, at 14.
165. EHRHARDT, supra note 1, § 608.1.
166. Saleeby, 3 So. 3d at 1087 (Canady, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 1087.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Answer Brief, supra note 13, at 11; Saleeby, 3 So. 3d at 1087 (Canady, J., dissenting).
171. Saleeby, 3 So. 3d at 1087 (Canady, J., dissenting).
172. Answer Brief, supra note 13, at 13-14.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 14.
175. See id.
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The Florida Supreme Court failed to adequately address these issues
because its analysis omitted a thorough discussion of the purpose and
function of Sections 768.041(3) and 90.408. Although evidence of
settlement may not be initially admissible under Section 768.041(3),
once a party chooses to use the prior defendant as a witness, the party
potentially opens the door to cross-examination concerning the prior
defendant's interest or involvement in the litigation. When a plaintiff
like Saleeby chooses to use the prohibition of settlement evidence as a
sword instead of a shield, he should bear the risk that the armor will be
stripped from him, lest it be used to skew the outcome.
D. A Court Should Still Analyze the Prejudicial Effect of the
Settlement Evidence
In sum, if a party chooses to call a prior defendant as a witness,
Sections 90.408 and 768.041(3) should not be read to prohibit a trial
court from permitting the opposing party to reveal the prior defendant's
own stake and involvement in the ongoing litigation if such action is
warranted. It is worth emphasizing, however, that determining that a
trial judge may admit such evidence does not mean that the court should
do so. Section 90.403 states that "evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice."l 76 A court should admit evidence regarding a witness's prior
position in the litigation only if the value of this information for
impeachment purposes is not substantially outweighed by the prejudice
that will result from the jury learning that the witness has settled with
the plaintiff.7 7
It may very well be that the admission of such evidence will rarely
be regarded as appropriate. In many cases, for instance, the settling
defendant will have paid the plaintiff-who has subpoenaed him to the
witness stand-a large sum of money. As a result, the settling defendant
might be in no mood to help the plaintiff when testifying. Moreover,
when the Third District Court of Appeal confronted the argument in
Jordan that evidence of settlement was admissible to show bias, it
explained that although courts often instruct juries that evidence of
settlement is admissible on the question of credibility of the witness and
not on the question of liability, "such reasoning is not realistic, for, . . .
it is a practical impossibility to eradicate from the jury's minds the
consideration that where there has been a payment there must have been
176. FLA. STAT. § 90.403.
177. MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, Compromise and Offers to Compromise, § 408:1 (2009). In
reaching this determination, a court must also consider the probable effectiveness of a limiting
instruction under Rule 105. Fed. R. Evid. 105.
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liability."17 8 Nevertheless, the Florida Supreme Court went a step too
far in Saleeby in concluding that the admission of settlement evidence is
never appropriate.
Finally, not only should Florida courts be permitted to undertake the
Section 90.403 analysis, but courts must also have the discretion to
consider other policy reasons that may warrant disclosure of a
settlement, such as the integrity of our judicial system, judicial fairness,
truth finding, and the potential for misleading juries.179
VI. CONCLUSION
In Saleeby, the Florida Supreme Court arrived at a simple, but
incorrect, reading of the law. It melded Florida Statutes Sections
768.041(3) and 90.408 together to conclude categorically that these
provisions "expressly prohibit[] the admission at trial of evidence of
settlement."' 8 0 The Court's reading of these provisions, which failed to
account for their specific underlying purposes, caused it to err. Flatly
outlawing the use of settlement evidence to show the bias of a witness,
much less a witness permitted to render opinions, can lead to an
unjustified outcome in the extreme case.
Sections 768.041(3) and 90.408 do not automatically prohibit the
admission of settlement evidence at trial. First, Section 90.408 and other
provisions of Florida's Evidence Code specifically treat evidence of
settlement to be admissible for proper purposes, such as showing that
the witness is biased. Second, Section 768.041(3) does not preclude
defendants from offering evidence concerning the bias of plaintiff's
witnesses. Because Section 768.041(3) is designed to protect tort parties
from prejudicial arguments, it should give way to a Section 90.403
analysis when a party chooses to build its own case on the credibility of
a settling defendant's testimony.
The Saleeby decision sets a troubling precedent for Florida courts
and will likely create more confusion in Florida evidence law than it
resolved. The Court, or if necessary, the Florida Legislature, should
attend to this problem before another miscarriage of justice results.
178. City of Coral Gables v. Jordan, 186 So. 2d 60, 63 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966). Courts
should not rely on the assumption that evidence of settlement is automatically unfairly
prejudicial to plaintiffs. Dolan, supra note 137, at 397-98.
179. See Dosdourian v. Carsten, 624 So. 2d 241, 244-46 (Fla. 1993).
180. Saleeby v. Rocky Elson Constr., Inc., 3 So. 3d 1978, 1986 (Fla. 2009).
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